This paper provides new evidence on both the positive and negative externalities arising from compulsory schooling laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
The compulsory school leaving age restricts the minimum amount of time students must spend in school before they have the legal option to exit the system of formal education. Most empirical studies have investigated how these laws have directly affected those students that want to leave high school as soon as possible. The majority find that students on the margin of dropping out reap a host of benefits by being compelled to stay in school.
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However, opponents of these laws continue to question whether their reported benefits are worth the resources necessary to make compulsory attendance an effective means of promoting education. Given the ongoing policy debate surrounding compulsory schooling laws, it is important that researchers fully evaluate the consequences of raising the minimum dropout age. This is the one of the first papers to evaluate both the potential social benefits and costs of compulsory schooling legislation. Authors such as Lang and Kropp (1996) argue that when low performing students are forced to stay in school other students will improve their performance in order to differentiate themselves from would-be dropouts. This signaling mechanism may generate additional benefits from compulsory schooling. Alternatively, a number of studies in the peer effects literature have found that sharing a school or classroom with underachieving students leads to increased disciplinary problems and reduced academic achievement. One would think that compulsory schooling laws, which restrict would-be dropouts from leaving school, might have similar effects.
In testing these alternative hypotheses, this paper examines the effect of strict compulsory schooling laws at different points of the ability distribution within schools. In doing so, I am able to identify in which instances stricter compulsory schooling laws have generated net positive or net negative externalities. The corresponding analysis considers a number of education related outcomes, including the probability of taking honors classes and college entrance exams, as well as performance on such exams. It also includes a rich set of state-level control variables, as well as state and time fixed effects, to ensure that the results of this study are unlikely to be driven by policy endogeneity.
I find that stricter laws push above average students to take more honors classes. These students are similarly driven to take college entrance exams and score higher on such exams as a result of the educational sorting set in motion by raising the dropout age. Conversely, below average students who share classrooms with would-be dropouts are greatly harmed by stricter compulsory schooling laws. Overall, below-average white and above-average black students experience some negative consequences from more stringent schooling laws, while Hispanics tend to benefit. The pattern of results across students of different ability suggests that any policy endogeneity would have to be sufficiently complex to account for the findings of this paper. In addition, these findings are not likely to be driven by changes in student composition directly resulting from such laws. With the pronounced rise in U.S. wage inequality since 1980, the incidence of high school dropout has become a particular concern for national policy makers. The National Education Association (NEA) has put forth a 12-point action plan for reducing school dropout rates. Among its recommendations, the NEA advocates that high school graduation or equivalency be made compulsory for everyone below 21 years of age.
Currently the majority of states in the United States have a minimum school leaving age of 16. However, there have been a number of states that have raised their dropout age since the 1970s. Table I provides the compulsory schooling age for each state for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Over this time period, six states and the District of Columbia enacted stricter compulsory schooling laws. Additionally, Arkansas and Tennessee experimented with lowering their minimum schooling age in the 1980s only to subsequently raise it to 17 by 1990. Wyoming is the only state to have lowered its minimum school leaving age (from 17 to 16) between 1970 and 1990.
The United States witnessed a number of other important trends over the same time period. Table II presents historical averages for a range of demographic, economic, and education-related variables. As a proportion of the total population, the number of minorities increased from 16 to 24.3 percent over this twenty year period. The US population also became relatively older and more educated. In particular, the share of working age adults with less than a high school education declined enormously from 42 to 16 percent. This improvement in general education levels likely facilitated the passage of stricter compulsory schooling laws. Real income rose over this period, while employment became less concentrated in manufacturing.
Structural changes in the economy produced an increase in the demand for skilled labor and likely served as a further impetus for raising the legal dropout age. These demographic and economic changes probably led to increased political support for the passage of stricter compulsory schooling laws and also of other education reforms. Over this same period, spending on primary and secondary education increased by approximately two thousand dollars (in 1990 prices) per pupil.
In order to further explore the determinants of changes in compulsory schooling laws, I regress whether a state has a dropout age above 16 on all of the state characteristics summarized in Table II , along with state and time fixed effects. These results, presented in Table III , suggest that increasing the poverty rate by one percent increases the likelihood that a state enacts a stricter dropout age by 4.25 percent. Dropouts disproportionately come from poorer households.
If rising poverty leads to an increasing dropout rate, law makers are likely to respond by raising the compulsory schooling age. Alternatively, an increase in the percentage of the state population under the age of 25 lowers the probability that a state raises the dropout age. A larger number of youth likely increases the financial costs associated with any education reform. These findings suggest that policy makers are sensitive to both the potential benefits and costs of changing compulsory schooling laws.
The education level of a state's working age population (e.g., those aged 25 to 64) also affects the compulsory schooling age. Specifically, I find that shifting one percent of the working age population from less than a high school education to high school graduates increases the likelihood that a state enacts a stricter dropout age by 3.74 percent. This effect is highly statistically significant. However, further shifts of the working age population towards becoming college educated appear to have no additional effect on the probability that more stringent compulsory schooling laws are passed.
Comparing these findings to those pertaining to earlier periods points to important ways in which the politics of compulsory education in the United States have both remained similar and changed over time. Examining the determinants of compulsory schooling law changes between 1915 and 1939 , Lleras-Muney (2002 finds no relationship between educational spending and compulsory schooling age. This author also finds a negative, statistically significant association between dropout age and the share of blacks in the state population. Both of these results also hold for the period between 1970 and 1990. In addition, I find that a larger manufacturing sector (as measured by its share of total state employment) increases the probability that a stricter dropout age is passed. Relative size of manufacturing was found to have no impact on compulsory schooling laws between 1915 and 1939. Finally, immigration appears to have played an important role in compulsory schooling changes in the early half, but not the latter half of the 20 th century.
Most of the research on compulsory schooling laws fails to account for other state characteristics that change over time. However, the above analysis highlights many factors that are both associated with the passage of stricter compulsory schooling laws and that are also likely to be correlated with the family, community, and school inputs that affect student education. Failing to control for these factors might otherwise bias findings on the impacts of these laws. Therefore in the analysis that follows, I include all of these state-level characteristics as control variables.
III. RELATED LITERATURE
Compulsory schooling laws have been used extensively in the recent literature to evaluate the benefits of more years of schooling. Angrist and Krueger (1991) , Margo and Finegan (1996) , and Oreopoulos (2007b) provide evidence that compulsory schooling laws lead to increases in high school attendance, as well as completion. Krueger (1991) and Oreopoulos (2006) find that an additional year of compulsory schooling raises annual earnings by over 10 percent. Oreopoulos (2007a) estimates that lifetime wealth increases by about 15 percent with an extra year of compulsory schooling. He also finds that students compelled to stay in school are less likely to report being in poor health, unemployed, or unhappy. In addition, a number of studies have used variation in compulsory schooling laws to evaluate non-pecuniary benefits to education, including: lowering the likelihood of committing a crime and being incarcerated (Lochner and Moretti, 2004) , decreasing the probability of death among the elderly (LlerasMuney, 2005) , and reducing teen pregnancy (Black et al., 2004) .
The literature has focused a lot less extensively on possible externalities resulting from compulsory schooling laws. In one of the few empirical papers to consider such effects, Lang and Kropp (1996) postulate that even those not targeted by these laws might have to increase their years of education in order to differentiate themselves from the bulk of students legally compelled to stay in school. Using data from 1908 to 1970, they find that compulsory attendance laws increase enrollment rates in age groups they do not directly affect and interpret this as evidence of educational sorting. However, these authors do not control for state-specific variables. The same political process that leads to stricter compulsory schooling laws is also likely to promote increased educational resources at the state level. Failing to adequately account for educational spending and other state characteristics might potentially lead to upward biased estimates of the effects of a stricter dropout age.
To date, the literature on compulsory schooling laws has scarcely suggested any potential negative externalities resulting from these types of laws. One potential mechanism by which compulsory schooling laws might harm students is if crowding out occurs. Specifically, if strengthening of compulsory attendance laws is not accompanied with additional educational funding, high schools would then be forced to divide their fixed resources over a larger pool of students.
The large literature on peer effects also suggests that the students who are compelled to attend school may interfere with the learning of other students. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) characterize dropouts as lacking non-cognitive or behavioral skills relative to their peers that complete high school. A number of studies have found that sharing a school or classroom with students with behavioral problems leads to increased peer disciplinary problems and reduced academic achievement of other students. Researchers have identified these behavioral peer effect channels by examining the externalities caused by boys with feminine names (Figlio, 2007) , children from families that experience domestic violence (Carrell and Hoekstra, 2008) , students with attention deficit disorder (Aizer, 2009) , and grade repeaters (Lavy et al., 2008) .
In this paper, I provide new evidence on the externalities arising from compulsory schooling laws. I analyze the factors that resulted in more recent changes in the dropout age and include a rich set of controls for state characteristics that potentially affected both educational outcomes and the passage of these laws. Compared to the past, today's dropouts mostly come from relatively poor families. It is not clear whether mandating these individuals to remain in school beyond 16 years of age would generate the same effects as those found in earlier studies.
Most importantly, this paper examines the effect of compulsory schooling laws at different points of the ability distribution within schools. Doing so, it identifies in which instances stricter compulsory schooling laws have generated net positive or net negative externalities. The analysis that follows takes a number of steps to ensure that these findings are not likely to be driven by changes in the composition of students directly resulting from these laws.
IV. DATA
The analysis in this paper primarily draws on data from a series of longitudinal studies My sample consists of high school seniors who attended public schools in the United States (including the District of Columbia). The sample is further restricted to students who were not missing information on state of residence and transcript information. I match each student to the compulsory schooling age that was in place in his or her state when he or she was 16 years old. This information is reported in various years of the Digest of Education Statistics published by the National Center for Education Statistics. I also match individuals with characteristics of their state when they were 16. These include per pupil expenditure on both basic and higher education, per capita income, the unemployment and poverty rate, the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing, the average annual wage in manufacturing per worker, as well as information on the age, education, gender, and racial composition of the population. State-level data was collected from the Digest of Education Statistics, the Regional Economic Information System of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the 1970, 1980, and 1990 US Census.
Following the signaling argument of Lang and Kropp, we might expect stricter compulsory schooling laws to push more marginal students to try to differentiate themselves from those students legally compelled to stay in school. To test this hypothesis, I investigate whether stricter compulsory school laws affect the likelihood of students taking an honors course in English or mathematics in their junior or senior year of high school and the likelihood of taking a college entrance exam. Finally for those who took a college entrance exam, I examine the effect of stricter mandatory schooling laws on these test scores.
In the United States, there are two leading college admissions tests -the SAT and ACT.
Both tests have been administered in approximately the same forms for several decades. I
analyze the effect of compulsory schooling laws on the composite score of the SAT (e.g., the sum of the math and verbal subscores). The composite SAT score has a mean of 1000 and a standard deviation around 200 (with a maximum score of 1600 and a minimum of 400). For students who took the ACT instead of the SAT, I convert their ACT composite score from its native scale (ranging from 1 to 36) to the more familiar SAT scale.
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Table IV presents summary statistics separately for each cohort both for all high school seniors and for those that took a college entrance exam. Changes in the demographic composition of high school seniors mirror the national trends outlined in Table II . The NCES data also highlights the increased educational ambition of more recent cohorts. Between 1972 and 1992 the proportion of seniors that had taken a math (English) honors class increased from 14 (14) percent to 42 (36) percent. Over the same period, the fraction of seniors who had taken a college entrance exam increased from 45 percent to 69 percent. Table IV 
V. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To investigate the effect of compulsory schooling laws on student achievement, I estimate the following regression: To account for this possibility I control for a host of time varying state characteristics.
Similarly to Lleras-Muney, I find that the inclusion of such control variables does not greatly affect the sign or magnitude of the estimated effect of stricter compulsory schooling laws. I also consider specifications that include cohort-by-region fixed effects and that control for the average state high school student-teacher ratio. Taking either or both steps also does not significantly affect the estimates of the effect of stricter compulsory schooling laws. Instead, attempts to control for state and region time-varying characteristics tend to reduce the size of standard error estimates. These findings suggest that policy endogeneity is unlikely to significantly bias the main results of this paper.
In addition, it is important to note that a relatively small subset of states changed their compulsory schooling laws over the period analyzed in this paper. One might be concerned that any estimated effect of dropout age is driven by one particular state. To address this possibility, I
estimate each specification dropping one-by-one each of the states that changed the compulsory schooling age between 1970 and 1990. The results presented in this paper are highly robust to the removal of any particular state from its sample.
Finally, I cluster my standard errors by state cohort. However as Bertrand et al. (2004) point out, the error term of this type of empirical model is likely to be serially correlated. If this is the case, standard errors clustered at the state by cohort level will be inconsistent. Therefore, I
also try clustering standard errors at the state level. This change does not drastically alter the size of standard errors and, therefore, the statistical inferences that can be made based on the estimated models.
VI. RESULTS
I begin by estimating the basic specification over the entire sample of public school students. These results are presented in Table V . Each column corresponds to a different outcome variable. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is whether the student took an honors class in either English or mathematics their junior or senior year of high school. Based on the entire sample of public high school seniors, I find that raising the compulsory schooling age above 16 has no effect on the likelihood of the average student taking honors classes. In the third column, the dependent variable is whether the student took a college entrance exam. Again, there appears to be no effect of having a stricter dropout age on the probability that the average student takes either the SAT or ACT.
It is important to bear in mind that these estimates reflect both direct and indirect effects of increasing the compulsory schooling age. Specifically, raising the dropout age will increase the number of marginal students remaining in school. Since would-be dropouts are unlikely to take honors classes or college entrance exams, this compositional change would generate negative estimated effects of increasing the dropout age even if the number of students taking honors classes and the SAT/ACT did not change. Since I am interested in identifying the externalities resulting from increasing the minimum school leaving age, one strategy for isolating such effects is to consider circumstances under which compositional changes are unlikely to obscure compulsory schooling externalities.
In the fourth column of Table V , I consider the effect of raising the compulsory age above 16 on combined SAT scores. Since the types of students that are compelled to stay in school because of these laws are not very likely to aspire to attend college (and thus take the SAT or ACT), these results are less likely to be contaminated by composition effects. Increasing the dropout age above 16 has a small positive effect, increasing combined SAT scores by approximately 14.5 points (or 0.073 of a standard deviation). However, this estimate is not statistically significant.
As a robustness check, I further limit the sample to rule out the possibility of compositional changes driving these results. Specifically, I use information on student degree aspirations and college enrollment intentions to identify serious students that are unlikely to include those students legally compelled to stay in school. One of these selection criteria is that a student plans to immediately attend a four year college. The other is that the student has a minimum goal of attaining a bachelor's degree. Table VI presents results when the sample is restricted to students that satisfy either of these criteria.
Compulsory schooling laws have slightly stronger positive effects on this subsample of more ambitious students. Specifically, I find that increasing the dropout age above 16 increases the likelihood that these students take a math honors class by 9.4 percent. This effect is statistically significant at conventional levels. I also find similar positive effects of stricter laws on the likelihood of taking an honors English class and of taking a college entrance exam.
However, these later estimates are not statistically significant. The estimated effect of stricter compulsory schooling laws on combined SAT scores is similar to that found with the full sample and, again, is not statistically significant. Overall, these positive effects are consistent with the signaling effects hypothesized by Lang and Kropp.
To this point I have focused on estimating the average effect of increasing the dropout age over all students. However, both the educational sorting model put forth by Lang and Kropp and the literature on peer effects suggest that compulsory schooling externalities should be centered on particular types of students. Specifically, a sorting model suggests that students of slightly higher ability relative to would-be dropouts are most likely to exert additional effort on their education in order to differentiate themselves from those legally compelled to stay in school longer. This positive externality is likely to diminish as one considers students of increasing ability. Conversely, any peer effects arising from compulsory schooling laws are more likely to be experienced by lower ability students who share a larger amount of classroom time with would-be dropouts.
Table VII presents results broken down by class rank quintile. Class rank is a within school measure of relative ability. The educational sorting model implies that students will take efforts to preserve their relative ability ranking. Therefore it is unlikely that compulsory schooling laws will lead to changes in the composition of students, particularly in the middle and upper quintiles of the class rank distribution. Note that looking at the effects on students of varying class ranks is also suggestive about whether the laws are endogenous or not. In particular if I were to find large effects of compulsory schooling laws on top high school students, this would suggest that the estimated effects of law changes are also possibly picking up other educational reforms.
Increasing the dropout age over 16 increases the likelihood that students in the top quintile of their class take a college entrance exam by 8 percent. This effect is statistically significant at conventional levels. I also find similar, though smaller and not statistically significant, positive effects of stricter laws on the likelihood of taking either an English or math honors class and of taking a college entrance exam. The estimated effect of stricter compulsory schooling laws on combined SAT scores is small, positive, and not statistically significant.
Increasing the dropout age appears to have a significantly larger positive effect on students whose class rank puts them in the top twenty to forty percent of their high school classmates. Specifically, stricter compulsory schooling laws increase the likelihood that these students take English and math honors classes by 9.4 and 17.2 percent, respectively. Both of these estimates are statistically significant. Stricter laws are also found to have a small positive, though not statistically significant effect on the likelihood of students in the second class rank quintile taking a college entrance exam. Conversely, I find that raising the dropout age above 16 has a moderately large positive effect on college entrance exam performance, increasing combined SAT scores by around 44 points (or a fifth of a standard deviation). This estimate is also highly statistically significant.
Turning to the students at the bottom of the class, stricter compulsory schooling laws appear to have negative effects on educational outcomes. Such estimates potentially reflect peer effects or crowding out, but they could also result from law driven compositional changes in high school students. According to the analysis of Oreopoulos (2007) based on the Current Population Survey (CPS), increasing the dropout age above 16 increased the high school completion rate by 1.3 percent. 4 If we assume that all dropouts come from the bottom 2 class rank quintiles and that none of these students take honors classes or college entrance exams, this would imply a composition effect slightly over -3 percent. The negative effects that I find for students at the bottom of the class are significantly larger than this. Specifically, I find that stricter compulsory schooling laws decrease the likelihood that these students take English and math honors classes by 5.4 and 5.9 percent, respectively. Similarly, they decrease the likelihood that these lower ranked students take college entrance exams by 8 percent. Therefore, it would appear that these laws have negative impacts on the educational outcomes of weaker students that were not on the verge of dropping out. This result is consistent with the idea that such students experience negative peer effects generated by would-be dropouts that are legally compelled to stay in school. Additionally, would-be dropouts might crowd out such students from classroom resources.
The notion that compulsory schooling laws might induce negative peer effects or crowding out is further supported by looking at the effect of an increased dropout age on the college entrance exam performance of lower ranked students. The results above imply that fewer of these students are taking the SAT and ACT because of compulsory schooling externalities.
Those who subsequently choose not to take these tests are likely to be the weaker students within this ability group. Therefore, the resulting compositional changes in test takers are likely to imply positive effects of stricter schooling laws on test performance. Instead, I find large negative effects on college entrance exam scores. Specifically, raising the dropout age above 16 decreases combined SAT scores by around 56 points (or over a quarter of a standard deviation).
This estimate is highly statistically significant.
One explanation for these negative outcomes is that with higher ranked students selecting more into honors classes as a result of compulsory schooling externalities, lower ranked students are being crowded out of such opportunities. Such a scenario is more likely to result if the availability of honors class slots does not increase to meet the corresponding rise in demand.
However according to the information provided in Table IV , the proportion of high seniors taking honors classes has steadily increased over time. Therefore, it is more likely that these negative effects are being driven by peer effect mechanisms instead of crowding out.
It appears that stricter compulsory schooling laws have little to no net effect on middle ranked students. For the third class rank quintile, the sign of the estimated effect of an increased dropout age varies depending on the outcome. However, effects for these students are never statistically significant and are typically small in magnitude. On the one hand, one would expect these students to take greater efforts to distinguish themselves from would-be dropouts compelled to be in school longer as a result of stricter laws. This is especially true, given the distinction in findings between students ranked in the top and second class rank quintiles. On the other hand, these same students are also very likely to share classrooms with would-be dropouts and, thus, suffer negative peer effects from their continued stay in the formal education system. Therefore, one explanation for the findings for middle ranked students is that these countervailing forces are effectively canceling each other out.
I also break down results for the subsample of students with strong college ambitions by class rank quintile. For the most part, these results, presented in Table VIII , are very similar to those based on the full sample. For ambitious students in the second class rank quintile, stricter compulsory schooling laws increase the likelihood that these students take English and math honors classes by an even larger degree (14.4 and 20.5 percent, respectively). For bottom ranked students with strong college ambitions, raising the dropout age above 16 has a particularly large negative effect, decreasing test scores by around 84 points (or 0.42 of a standard deviation). This later result further suggests that my general findings for low ranked students are being driven by peer effects instead of compositional effects.
Finally, I analyze the effects of the laws by race/ethnicity. Prior studies such as Margo (1986) and Lleras-Muney (2002) find that stricter compulsory schooling laws had no impact on blacks. These authors at least partially attribute such findings to general racial policies in place during the era of segregation. My analysis is focused on the period after segregation. For blacks, I find that stricter compulsory schooling laws resulted in mixed effects. These estimates are presented in Table IX .
Stricter compulsory schooling laws appear to have increased the likelihood that black students take honors classes. This result is driven by black students in the top half of their high school class. For black students in the bottom half of their class, I find that more stringent laws had a negative effect on the likelihood of these students taking math honors classes. This later estimate is likely to be biased downward because of composition effects. Looking at belowaverage black students with strong college ambitions, this negative effect dissipates and becomes statistically insignificant. Alternatively, stricter laws increase the probability that ambitious, but below-average black students take English honors classes by around 20 percent. Results broken down by race/ethnicity for the subsample of students with strong college ambitions are presented in Table X .
An increased dropout age greatly reduces the probability that black students take a college entrance exam. Specifically, above-average black students are 24 percent less likely to take the SAT or ACT as a result of stricter compulsory schooling laws. I find a similar effect for below-average black students, though this later estimate is likely to be biased downward by composition effects. Negative effects on the likelihood of taking a college entrance exam are less pronounced and not statistically significant for black students with strong college ambitions.
As noted earlier, a reduction in the number of students taking either the SAT or ACT is likely to result in higher average scores for the remaining test takers. The compositional change in test takers is likely to imply that stricter schooling laws have a positive effect on test scores.
This is exactly what we find for below-average black students. Looking at below-average black students with strong college ambitions, this positive effect becomes less pronounced and not statistically significant. However, I find a large negative effect of raising the dropout age on the college entrance exam scores of above-average black students, with a decline in scores of almost half a standard deviation. The effect on test scores for above-average blacks with strong college ambitions is similar in size and also statistically significant. These results are also striking considering the findings that higher ability black students take more difficult classes in response to stricter schooling laws.
Like Oreopoulos (2007b) , I find that Hispanics appear to benefit the most from recent changes to the school leaving age. Stricter compulsory schooling laws substantially increase the likelihood that Hispanic students take English and math honors classes (by 34.3 and 25.5 percent, respectively). This result holds for both above and below-average Hispanic students.
Raising the dropout age over 16 does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of Hispanic students taking either the SAT or ACT. Hispanics do appear to greatly benefit from stricter schooling laws in terms of college entrance exam scores, with gains of over a half a standard deviation. This later result is driven by Hispanic students in the top half of their high school class. Effects for Hispanics with strong college ambitions are similarly large.
Effects for whites are generally not as strong. I find that stricter compulsory schooling laws generally do not have a statistically significant effect on the decision of above-average white students to take honors classes or college entrance exams. Raising the dropout age has a slight positive effect on the college entrance exam scores of above-average white students, though this result is also not statistically significant. Finally, the results for below-average white students are generally consistent with those found over the entire sample of students.
VII. CONCLUSION
The previous literature has highlighted the potential benefits of stricter compulsory schooling laws. This paper presents evidence that policies that encourage would-be dropouts to remain in school result in both social costs, as well as benefits. I find that stricter laws push above average students to take more honors classes. These students are similarly driven to take college entrance exams and score higher on such exams as a result of the educational sorting set in motion by raising the dropout age. Conversely, below average students who share classrooms with would-be dropouts are greatly harmed by stricter compulsory schooling laws. As a result of such laws, lower ability students take honors classes and college entrance exams less frequently.
Those who do take the SAT or ACT earn substantially lower scores as a result of stricter compulsory schooling laws. Hispanics have greatly benefited from recent efforts to raise the legal dropout age. Conversely, above-average black students and below-average white students have experienced considerable declines in college entrance exam scores as a result of stricter compulsory schooling laws. I include a rich set of state-level control variables, as well as state and time fixed effects, to ensure that these results are unlikely to be driven by policy endogeneity. These results are robust to a number of alternative specifications and are also unlikely to be driven by changes in the composition of students that directly result from stricter compulsory schooling laws.
The pattern of results across students of different ability and race/ethnicity suggest that any policy endogeneity would have to be sufficiently complex to account for the findings of this paper. It is important that policy makers think in comprehensive terms when considering potential education reforms. Efforts aimed at making gains at the extensive margin of education (e.g., aggregate years of schooling) can potentially be made at the expense of the intensive margin (e.g., how much students learn). Instituting stricter compulsory schooling laws is likely to result in both winners and losers. In order to mitigate the social costs generated by these laws, further research is needed on the underlying mechanisms that drive these externalities. Notes: Each estimate is from a separate regression. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by state-year. All models include state and year fixed effects, as well as controls for gender, race, parental education and income and state time-varying characteristics. The corresponding coefficient estimates for these controls are omitted from the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of observations is rounded to the nearest ten to comply with IES publication policy.
IX. TABLES

